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Trade agreements are increasingly being negotiated between developed and emerging 
economy partners. An example is the EU–India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) for which 
negotiations began in 2007. There has been a debate on the potential effects of the pro-
posed FTA and how this can impact on India’s key export sectors. Our study addresses 
this aspect from a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling perspective. 
Using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) framework, we analyse trade and welfare 
impacts of the proposed FTA between the EU and India. Two scenarios are modelled: 
first, complete and immediate elimination of tariff on all goods traded and second, selec-
tive tariff elimination on textiles, wearing apparel and leather goods—products in which 
India has a comparative advantage. Results under both scenarios show that India enjoys 
positive welfare effects though there is a possibility of trade diversion. Under scenario 1, 
India loses due to negative terms of trade (ToT) effect. Under scenario 2, with selective 
sectoral liberalisation, gains are mainly concentrated in textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather sectors. There is a positive output effect from change in demand for factors of 
production suggesting that the proposed FTA could lead to relocation of labour-intensive 
production to India.
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1. IntroductIon
India and the EU have been negotiating a bilateral free-trade and investment 
agreement (BTIA) since June 2007. The proposed agreement aims to be a 
broad-based trade and investment agreement, which will cover over 95 per 
cent of tariff lines and also liberalise non-conventional sectors in services and 
investments, with rules on domestic regulation, competition and government 
procurement. Talks have been at a standstill for some time and several deadlines 
have been missed. The negotiating partners propose to renew talks in June 
2015 and address unresolved issues on market access. The proposed agreement 
is ambitious in that it will create one of the world’s largest free-trade areas—
covering 1.8 billion, representing a quarter of the world’s people with bilateral 
trade at over €100 billion in 2014–15. Further, increasing trade between the EU 
and India reaffirms the importance of the EU as India’s largest trading partner. 
Finally, the proposed agreement will not only open markets and further business 
opportunities for EU firms (European Commission, 2010), but also be a means 
to further a normative aspiration of the EU to export its preferred model of 
liberalisation, governance and multilateral regulation (Khorana & Garcia, 2014).
This article employs computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis to 
examine the macroeconomic effects of trade liberalisation through a free-trade 
agreement (FTA) between the EU and India by focusing on trade, production 
and welfare effects. We also explore the link between trade creation, factor 
endowments and the economic size of trading partners and whether an FTA 
between dissimilar countries can potentially amplify inequalities by impacting 
on welfare in the partner and third countries. Thus, the article comments on 
the developmental dimension of the proposed FTA and also on the possible 
benefits of such an agreement between two unequal partners, in this case, 
India and the EU, for those sectors in which India has a comparative advantage. 
Using the example of textiles, wearing apparel and leather goods, which 
constitute nearly one-third of India’s total exports to the EU (Eurostat, 2012), 
the article analyses the effects of selective liberalisation of sectors in which 
India has a comparative advantage. The rationale for analysing specific sectors is 
that studies model potential economic outcomes to analyse the overall economic 
effects of the FTA between EU and India1 (Achterbosch, Kuiper & Roza, 2008; 
1  For an exhaustive discussion on EU–India FTA analysis, see Agence Europe (2007), Decreux 
and Mitaritonna (2007), Achterbosch et al. (2008), Khorana et al. (2008), Powell (2008), Khorana 
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Agence Europe, 2007; Decreux & Mitaritonna, 2007; ECORYS, 2009) with 
some examining ‘deep’ versus ‘shallow’ integration effects (ECORYS, 2009; 
Gasiorek et al., 2007). None of these analyse the welfare, trade and distributional 
effects on sectors in which India has a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the EU. 
The article is organised as follows: The second section presents an overview on 
economic integration literature highlighting recent studies. The third section 
analyses goods trade patterns between the EU and India, focusing in particular 
on trade in textiles, wearing apparel and leather products. The fourth section 
lists theoretical foundations of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). 
The fifth section discusses simulation scenarios and the results. The sixth 
section concludes with the way forward for FTA talks.
2. LIterature revIew
2.1. Literature on Regional Integration
Academic literature primarily focuses on examining ‘trade diversion’ and 
‘trade creation’ effects of FTAs (Viner, 1950).2 In recent years, economists have 
employed a multitude of approaches to portray regional integration effects. 
Recent studies find that trade agreements have significantly positive trade-
enhancing effects due to tariff reduction. For instance, Wannacott (1990) 
puts forth the ‘hub and spoke’ approach suggesting that there is an increased 
interconnectedness between trading partners. Other economists discuss the 
‘domino effect’ of FTAs and how this provides an impetus to non-participating 
countries to seek membership to trading agreements (Baldwin, 1993; Baldwin 
& Jaimovich, 2012). In terms of welfare analysis, Robinson and Thierfelder 
(2002) highlight welfare-enhancing potential of trade agreements for member 
countries and rest of the world. Thus, within extant literature, there is ample 
evidence on ‘building blocks’ proposition of trading agreements and how these 
are stepping stones for future multilateral trade liberalisation (Dent, 2003; 
Ethier, 1998; Khorana & Garcia, 2014; Summers, 1991; Wei & Frankel, 2005). 
But some researchers, however, put forth the ‘stumbling blocks’ approach and 
and Perdikis (2010), Khorana and Garcia (2013), Khorana and Asthana (2014) and European 
Commission (2015).
2  See Meade (1995), Lipsey (1970), Pomfret (1988) and Magee (2016) for an exhaustive economic 
overview on rationale and determinants of FTAs. Recent debate has concentrated on under- 
standing the effects of FTAs on non-members of FTA countries (Anderson & Yotov, 2011; Baier 
& Bergstrand, 2007; Brown, Deardorff & Stern, 1994; Dai, Yotov & Zylkin, 2014; Helpman et al., 
2008; Kehoe & Kehoe, 1994; Magee, 2008).
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argue that regional agreements detract partner countries’ efforts to liberalise 
at the multilateral level (Bhagwati, 1998; Panagariya, 1996, 2000; Srinivasan, 
1998). In a similar vein, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) propose the ‘spaghetti-
bowl’ approach and suggest that such arrangements generate complexity 
and contribute to lack of transparency in the global trading system. Despite 
unanimity on the effects of trading agreements, there is growing support for 
FTAs in that these agreements improve access to markets and level playing 
field, and build alliances for World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, 
though some cast doubts on the benefits of individual FTAs between large 
economies and smaller ones, and the wisdom of limited agreements (Baldwin, 
2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2013; Bhagwati & Panagariya, 1996; Bhagwati, 1998; 
Khorana & Garcia, 2013; Khorana et al., 2010; Krugman, 1993; Viner, 1950). 
However, given that trade agreements have been accepted as a way forward to 
regional integration, the negotiating countries are facing the challenge of how 
to maximise their benefits while minimising their costs (Ng & Yarcia, 2014).
Given that FTAs are increasing between developed and developing countries 
from different geographical regions, geography is an increasingly relevant issue 
for discussion. Literature suggests that geographical proximity determines 
total gains and losses, and that there is high trade dependence and low risk of 
trade diversion between countries from the same geographical region (Lipsey, 
1957; Summers, 1991). Cernat (2003) and Lee and Shin (2006) analyse the 
impact of geography on FTAs between developing and developed countries 
and report inconclusive evidence. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) report that trade 
creation is closely linked with relative factor endowments and the economic 
size of trading partners suggesting that an agreement between countries with 
dissimilar market size could potentially amplify inequalities. The World Bank 
(2000) report substantiates that benefits from FTAs vary with size and the level 
of development of the partner country. Magee (2003) is of the view that size 
and locational dissimilarity between developing and developing economies 
make these countries ‘unnatural partners’, which adversely impact on partner 
countries’ benefits. Within the framework of ‘natural trade partners’ hypothesis, 
Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995, 1998) and, more 
recently, Freund and Ornelas (2010) argue that trade diversion may be less 
relevant than initially perceived and countries are most likely to experience 
growth in trade after concluding a trading agreement. The importance of 
transport costs between countries also finds mention in ‘inherent regionalism’ 
theory advocated by Frankel (1997), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) and Frankel 
and Wei (1997). In addition to existing views, Grossman and Helpman (1991), 
Keller (1998) and Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) highlight that trade through 
agreements generates productivity links leading to technology transfer and 
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diffusion between members. Their findings are congruent with Baldwin’s 
‘domino theory’ which suggests that regional agreements trigger countries to 
lower bilateral import barriers ‘like a row of dominoes’ to avoid losses from 
the trade diversion effect in the event of these countries remaining outside the 
regional agreement (Baldwin, 1995; Baldwin & Venables, 1995).
Political economists have focused on domestic politics as drivers for trade 
liberalisation (Mansfield & Milner, 2012). Studies report that FTAs are guided 
by political motivations ranging from altering domestic coalitions against 
liberalisation to locking in domestic reforms, or emulating others (Aggarwal 
& Shuijiro, 2006; Ravenhill, 2003). Vicard (2009) draws attention to the fact 
that such trade agreements not only foster trade but also promote political and 
institutional integration. Recent literature concurs that FTAs are a mechanism 
to secure domestic economic reform and serve as a way of gaining international 
recognition and acceptance (Aggarwal & Lee, 2011; Aggarwal & Urata, 2006). 
Free-trade agreement proliferation has also been explained as a result of policy 
imitation based on fear of exclusion from regional initiatives rather than of 
economic losses (Solis, Katada & Stallings, 2009), and even been viewed as 
a reflection of geo-competition amongst actors (García, 2012). Recent work 
by Das, Piyadasa and Swarup (2012) points out that the lack of objectivity 
in different countries’ trade and economic regimes makes negotiations 
difficult. Such factors include non-tariff barriers, restrictive practices, custom 
administrative practices, technical barriers to trade, rules of origin for services 
and investment cooperation.
2.2. Literature on the Effects of the Proposed EU–India FTA
Studies employ both qualitative and quantitative approaches, including 
CGE modelling and gravity approach, to analyse the impact of the proposed 
EU–India FTA. Gasoirek et al. (2007) report an ‘ambiguous’ welfare effect from 
goods sector liberalisation and this is attributed to differences in comparative 
advantage between the EU and India. The Government of India Report (2007) 
finds that India will be a net loser in the goods sector, primarily as a result 
of revenue losses from lower or zero tariffs, though gains are expected to be 
achieved through services liberalisation. Agence Europe (2007) estimates that 
growth of trade in goods will favour the EU, and that EU exports will grow (by 
56.8 per cent), while India’s exports to the EU will register moderate growth (of 
18.7 per cent). Sectors such as wearing apparel and leather goods will benefit 
from higher exports, though export growth will be limited in manufactured 
items and food products. Decreux and Mitaritonna (2007) use the Modelling 
International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium (MIRAGE) 
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model to simulate tariff reduction (of 95 per cent) and report that EU exports 
to India will increase and lead to terms of trade (ToT) gains, particularly in 
the automobiles and machinery parts sector, which they estimate will grow by 
700 per cent. For estimating the effect of services liberalisation, the MIRAGE 
model simulates two scenarios—10 per cent and 25 per cent tariff cuts, 
respectively. Under both the scenarios, results show a positive trade impact for 
India such that the overall impact assessed in terms of real income is sensitive 
to the inclusion of services sectors for India to reap welfare benefits of the 
proposed FTA. 
Polaski, Kumar, McDonald and Robinson (2008) employ the CGE approach 
and results report increased trade—higher exports to the EU (5.5 per cent) and 
imports from the EU (3.4 per cent). The findings show that the overall impact 
on India would be slightly negative, with a welfare loss (US$250 million) and a 
decline in the overall real income and private household consumption. Largest 
increases are estimated in apparel and textiles (US$1.9 billion), followed by 
‘other manufacturing’, which includes leather and footwear (US$520 million), 
chemicals (US$220 million) and services (US$230 million). India’s imports 
are estimated to grow by US$2.6 billion (3.4 per cent) in manufactured goods, 
particularly capital goods (US$2.1 billion). Achterbosch, Kuiper and Roza (2008) 
and Powell (2008) report sectoral net welfare losses for India with benefits for 
the EU. Benefits are limited for India due to higher Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) tariffs, supply elasticities, revealed comparative advantage variations 
and barriers, such as ‘behind-the-border’ barriers to trade.
The ECORYS study (2009) uses CGE modelling and results show overall 
positive effects, though small in magnitude, for both the EU and India with 
losses in some sectors. Overall results show there are gains for India’s services 
exports to the EU. In particular, the estimates show that India is expected to 
gain €4.9 billion and €17.7 billion in the short and long run, respectively, while 
the EU is expected to gain €4.4 billion and €1.6 billion in the short and long 
term, respectively. For sectors such as motor vehicles and automotives sectors, 
the effects on output are expected to be positive for both the EU and India, 
especially when dynamic FDI effects are included. The study, however, predicts 
a decline in Indian manufacturing sector production with negative employment 
changes in paper production, publishing, transport equipment, processed food 
and beverages and tobacco products. Investment flows as a result of the FTA, 
and possible future barrier reductions are estimated to generate potentially 
large beneficial effects for both the EU and India, estimated at €17.7 billion. 
The impact of the FTA on real wages (both skilled and unskilled workers) is 
also positive with real wages in India estimated to increase by over 1.5 per cent. 
Margin—The Journal of Applied Economic Research 11 : 1 (2016): 1–22
Khorana and Narayanan Modelling effects of tariff liberalisation   7
3. eu–IndIa trade FLows In textILes, wearIng appareL and  
Leather goods
Trade data show that the EU is India’s largest trading partner (in terms of 
both imports and exports), while India ranks as EU’s eighth most important 
trading partner (Eurostat, 2012). Khorana et al. (2014) examine the degree of 
complementarity and examine intra-industry trade between the EU and India 
using the Grubel–Lloyd index (GII). Table 1 finds high GII across categories 
of manufactured goods (0.91) than non-manufactured goods (0.65), with the 
highest concentration in chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, while 
it is low for unskilled labour-intensive sectors, such as agricultural products, 
textiles and clothing. This finding underlies the rationale to analyse how 
liberalisation of the leather and textiles sectors through the proposed FTA would 
impact on welfare and trade. 
Trade in goods between the EU and India nearly trebled during 2000–11—
from €28.6 billion in 2003 to €79.9 billion in 2012. In 2012, nearly 19 per cent 
of India’s total goods exports went to the EU and 12per cent of India’s total 
Table 1 grubel–Lloyd Index for Trade between the EU and India
Product Groups (SITC Rev 3)
Year
2007 2009 2011
1000—Primary products 0.65 0.70 0.75
1100—Agricultural products  
(food including fish and raw materials)
0.42 0.40 0.44
1200—Fuels and mining products 0.81 0.89 0.88
2000—Manufactures 0.91 0.92 0.94
2100—Iron and steel 0.89 0.73 0.96
2200—Chemicals 0.91 1.00 0.91
2300—Other semi-manufactures 0.69 0.69 0.69
2400—Machinery and transport equipment 0.45 0.59 0.62
2410—Office and telecomm equipment 0.41 0.73 0.81
2420—Transport equipment 0.59 0.97 1.00
2430—Other machinery 0.39 0.37 0.42
2500—Textiles 0.14 0.15 0.16
2600—Clothing 0.02 0.01 0.02
2700—Other manufactures 0.75 0.84 0.87
3000—Other products 0.55 0.52 0.66
Total (all products) 0.95 0.96 0.99
Source: Khorana et al. (2014).
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imports came from the EU. In value terms, India’s exports to the EU were €31.3 
billion and imports were €32 billion.3 While goods exports grew at an average 
rate of 14 per cent per annum, this pattern reversed in the first half of 2012 
when India’s overall exports to the EU fell by 11 per cent, from €18.4 billion 
during January–June 2012 compared to €20.6 billion during January–June 2011 
(The Times of India, 2012). A detailed analysis of India’s trade on the basis of 
Harmonised System (HS) 2-digit data shows that textiles, wearing apparel and 
leather products (HS 52, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 42, respectively) constitute nearly a 
quarter of India’s total exports to the EU. In particular, the compound annual 
growth of wearing apparel has increased sharply from 3.7per cent in early 2000 
to 15.2 per cent following the elimination of Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) 
quantitative restrictions and quotas in 2005, though this trend has not been 
sustained and wearing apparel exports have registered a decline of 19.46 per 
cent on an year-on-year basis in the first half of 2012 (The Times of India, 2012). 
Table 2 presents top 10 tariff lines within textiles and wearing apparel showing 
3  Top export destinations within the EU were Germany (26 per cent) followed by the United 
Kingdom (16 per cent) and Belgium (13 per cent).
Table 2 EU’s Applied MFN and Preferential Tariffs for Textiles and Wearing 
Apparel (top 10 Indian exports)
HS Code Commodity
MFN Applied  
Tariffs  (%)
Preferential  
GSP Tariffs (%)
61091000 T-shirts, etc. of cotton 12.00 9.60
62063000 Blouses, shirts and shirt-blouses 
of cotton 
12.00 9.60
62052000 Men’s or boys’ shirts of cotton 12.00 9.60
62045200 Skirts and divided skirts of cotton 12.00 9.60
61112000 Babies’ garments, etc. of cotton 12.00 9.60
62044220 Dresses of cotton 12.00 9.60
62034200 Trousers, bib and brace overalls, 
breeches and shorts of cotton for 
men and boys
12.00 9.60
62046200 Trousers, bib and brace overalls, 
breeches and shorts of cotton 
12.00 9.60
50072090 Items other than saris containing 
>85% by weight of silk 
7.00 7.00
62064000 Blouses, shirts, etc. of man-made 
fibres
12.00 9.60
Source: DGCI&S (2013), Government of India.
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applied EU’s MFN and preferential Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP)4 
tariffs on Indian exports. 
Until 1 January 2014, Indian exports enjoyed preferential tariffs under the 
GSP framework on textiles but this sector has now been graduated out of the 
GSP scheme for India (EC Regulation 978/2012). If tariffs on wearing apparel 
were to enter the EU at zero tariffs under the FTA, this will allow Indian-made 
apparels’ market accessible in the EU and make it competitive compared to 
exports from Bangladesh, Vietnam, Mexico and Pakistan. Under the present 
regime, least developed countries exports of textiles and wearing apparel enjoy 
duty-free access under ‘Everything but Arms’ scheme (EC Regulation 416/2001) 
making Bangladeshi exports hugely competitive. Zero tariffs will also enable 
Indian exporters to be competitive vis-à-vis Chinese wearing apparel (Business 
Standard, 2012). Thus, Indian apparel exports which have of late suffered 
from rising costs and international economic downturn will be competitive 
(compared to Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Turkey and Mexico).
In 2011–12, Eurostat data show that EU’s imports of leather products from 
India were 65.48 per cent, with Germany as the largest market for Indian leather 
and leather products (12.52 per cent), followed by UK (11.98 per cent), Italy 
(8.81 per cent), France (5.86 per cent), Spain (5.52 per cent), the Netherlands 
(3.95 per cent), Belgium (1.90 per cent) and Denmark (1.71 per cent). Trade data 
show that leather shoes (64035111) and accessories (42022190 and 42022110) 
are main exports, with nearly half of the total leather exports concentrated 
under 10 top eight-digit lines. Further analysis reveals that 30 per cent of 
total leather products exported by India access the EU under the GSP scheme. 
Table 3 lists the top 10 tariff lines within leather, and the prevalent applied MFN 
and preferential tariffs on this product group.
Analysis reveals that 165 tariff lines are notified on leather and leather 
products (HS 41, 42 and 63) under the EU tariff schedule. Of this, 136 tariff 
lines enjoy preferential tariffs (3.5 percentage point reduction at the ad valorem 
rate) under the GSP scheme. The remaining 29 are non-sensitive and products 
come into the EU under zero tariffs. This suggests that nearly one-fourth of the 
total tariff lines notified under leather products enjoy duty-free access. Thus, 
leather accessories and garments (HS 42), such as leather handbags, jackets 
and saddles, that are currently allowed into the EU at zero tariffs under the 
4  GSP is a non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences granted by developed countries 
in favour of the developing countries, including special measures in favour of the least advanced 
among developing countries. The EU GSP, which was initiated in 1971, has been modified on 
several occasions and the EU adopted a new scheme in 2009–11 which applies to 176 developing 
countries, including India.
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Table 3  Applied MFN and Preferential Tariffs of Top 10 Leather Products 
Exported to the EU
HS Code Products
MFN Applied 
Rate (%)
Tariff Preference 
Rate (GSP) (%)
64035111 Ankle covered all-leather shoes 
for men 
8.00 4.50
42022190 Other leather handbags 3.00 0.00
42022110 Handbags of leather for ladies 3.00 0.00
42023120 Wallets and purses of leather 3.00 0.00
42031010 Jackets and jerseys 4.00 0.00
64031990 Others 8.00 4.50
64032029 Other footwear with all leather, 
open toed
8.00 4.50
64039110 Leather boots and other footwear 
with rubber sole 
8.00 4.50
42010000 Saddlery and harness for animals 2.70 0.00
64039910 Leather sandals with rubber sole 8.00 4.50
Source: DGCI&S (2013), Government of India.
existing GSP framework, might not benefit from further tariff reduction under 
the FTA scenario.
4. gtap ModeL: theoretIcaL FraMework
This article employs CGE modelling approach, developed by Hertel (1997), to 
analyse economic effects of the proposed EU–India FTA. The CGE approach 
analyses aggregate welfare and distributional impacts of policies whose effects 
may be transmitted through multiple markets (Perry, Whalley & McMahon, 
2001), international trade (Harrison, Rutherford & Tarr, 1997) and also assesses 
the impact of environmental regulation (Goulder, 2002). Computable general 
equilibrium models are an ex-ante analysis of trade policies and agreements 
capturing economy-wide impact of policy shocks associated with trade 
openness; they enable a quantitative assessment of the direct and indirect 
effects of changes in trade policy and other policy interventions while taking 
overall market relationships into account. The underlying theory of CGE is 
grounded in behavioural equations with the model assuming full employment 
and perfect competition in all markets such that demand equals supply and 
markets are self-clearing so that all producers receive the same marginal cost. 
Other assumptions include zero profits implying revenues must be exhausted 
through expenditure on domestic and imported intermediate inputs.
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The GTAP model has a single representative household which receives factor 
income and maximises utility subject to the expenditure constraint through the 
Constant Difference of Elasticity (CDS) and Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
(CES). Regional households allocate expenditure over private, government and 
savings according to Cobb–Douglas utility function and each component of the 
final demand is a constant share of total regional income. These goods represent 
CES combinations for domestic and imported goods (with CES aggregation of 
imports for each region) and the consumer demand elasticities draw on the work 
by Reimer and Hertel (2004). The model provides a basis for differentiation 
between products by countries and regions (Armington assumption), allows 
distinguishing between trade flows by country/region or destination and on 
the basis of agents, that is, intermediate demand, final demand by households, 
government and investment. Import shares are determined by the relative prices 
and substitution elasticities between domestic and imported commodities. 
The GTAP model has a nested production function which minimises total 
costs through substitution of inputs (primary and intermediate). At the first 
level, the intermediate input bundles and primary-factor bundles are used 
in fixed proportions according to a Leontief function. At the second level, 
intermediate input bundles are formed as combinations of imported bundles 
and domestic goods, and primary-factor bundles are obtained according to the 
CES form. At the third level, imported bundles are formed as CES composites 
of imported goods with the same name from each region. The parameters of 
factor substitution elasticities, factor transformation elasticities and investment 
parameters are based on Hertel, et al. (2004). 
The government has a fixed share of aggregate expenditure in each region 
which is allocated across commodities by a Cobb–Douglas distribution. The 
allocation of total expenditure on each good to domestically produced and 
imported versions is based on the same nesting scheme used to allocate total 
household expenditure on each good. The standard GTAP closure takes factor 
endowments, technology and tax and subsidy rates as exogenous variables. 
Investment is financed by a global pool of savings with each region contributing 
a fixed share to this pool. Savings are allocated to regions either in a fixed 
proportion or according to the relevant rates of return. 
This article employs GTAP database 7 which originally includes 57 
commodities and 113 regions with 2004 as the base year (Narayanan et al, 
2008). We aggregate the GTAP product groups into 11 sectors; the details of 
these are presented in Table 4. 
Table 5 presents an overview of the regional aggregation, which includes India 
and EU as well as other countries aggregated by regions.
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Table 4 Product groups
Product Groups Description
Agrifood Grains and crops
Fibres Fibres
Extraction Mining and extraction
Tex Textiles
Wap Clothing
Lea Leather
LightMnfc Light manufacturing
HeavyMnfc Heavy manufacturing
Util_Cons Utilities and construction
TransComm Transport and communication
OthServices Other services
Source: Based on GTAP database.
Table 5 Regional Aggregation
Regions Used for Analysis Regional Aggregation Description
China China
EastAsia East Asia
SEAsia Southeast Asia
India India
XSASIA South Asia
USACAN USA and Canada
LatinAmer Latin America
EU_27 European Union 27
MENA Middle East and North Africa
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
Rest of World Rest of the World
Source: Based on GTAP database.
The GTAP database sources include individual countries’ input–output tables, 
global trade information and aggregate bilateral trade statistics from UN trade 
statistics. This is supplemented by data from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank. Tariff 
and protection data are taken from the MacMap database at the HS-6 level, which 
is in turn aggregated using trade weights compiled from COMTRADE database.
5. sIMuLatIons and resuLts
The analysis is structured around a set of scenarios that recognise the importance 
of textiles, apparel and leather goods in India’s trade with the EU that these 
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product groups constitute nearly a third of the total Indian exports to the 
EU (Eurostat, 2012; Khorana & Soo, 2013). The model simulations examine 
product-related interests, conditional to India and EU opening up the market, 
through the following scenarios:
1. Scenario 1: Zero tariffs on all products and immediate implementation of 
the proposed EU–India FTA. This scenario models the effect of 100 per 
cent tariff elimination by EU and India on all goods, so that all bilateral 
tariffs are completely eliminated as soon as the FTA comes into force. 
2. Scenario 2: Sector-specific tariff elimination, that is, 100 per cent tariff 
elimination on textiles, wearing apparel and leather products including 
footwear (Texlea) by the EU and India. This scenario also simulates the 
elimination of all export tax equivalents of MFA quotas in the GTAP 
database.
To account for unemployment in India and other developing countries, the 
model assumes endogenous unskilled labour supply and exogenous wages.
To examine the macroeconomic effects of tariff elimination under the 
proposed FTA, as well as trade creation and diversion effects, we measured 
equivalent variation (EV), which is a measure of what change in income would 
be equivalent to the proposed policy change. The focus is mainly on allocative 
efficiency changes arising from any improvements in inter-sectoral resource 
allocation, ToT effect and changes in savings–investment balance.5 Table 6 
presents welfare effects in EV terms from: (i) 100 per cent tariff elimination on 
all goods under the FTA (scenario 1) and (ii) 100 per cent tariff elimination on 
selected products, such as textiles, apparel and leather products (scenario 2).
The analysis shows that some sectors gain, while others lose from liberalisation 
under the FTA. Simulation results for scenario 1, that models full liberalisation 
of all products, yield positive welfare effects for both the EU and India. Countries 
and regions outside the FTA report welfare losses, highest being in MENA 
(US$785) followed by SSA (US$326). This suggests EU–India FTA could have 
trade diversionary effects for other countries. The decomposition of welfare 
effects reveals that gains for the EU (US$2,964 million) are mainly driven 
by positive ToT and allocative efficiency effects. The breakdown of allocative 
efficiency by factors and commodities highlights heavy manufacturing industry 
and extraction industries as product groups that gain from the proposed FTA. 
5  The allocative efficiency gains accrue from optimum allocation of resources. The terms of trade 
effect are an indicative summary measure of change in ratio of prices received for exports and 
paid for imports.
14 Margin—The Journal of Applied Economic Research 11 : 1 (2016): 1–22 
Table 6 Welfare Effects under Scenarios 1 and 2 (in million US$)
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Effect
Endowment 
Effect
Terms of 
Trade Effect
Investment–
Savings Effect Total
Scenario 1
China –36.6 –44.8 –141.9 53.3 –169.9
EastAsia –12.4 0 56.8 78.4 122.9
SEAsia –18.4 8.4 –224.5 46.6 –187.9
India –272 3,125.4 –685.8 –243.9 1,936.7
XSASIA –21.4 –18.2 –5.6 –28.4 –73.6
USACAN 4.7 0 184.5 –89.1 100
LatinAmer 21.9 20.9 –138.4 14.9 –80.7
EU_27 511.7 0 2,399.1 53.3 2,964.1
MENA –40.6 0 –830.6 86.1 –785.1
SSA –24.6 –13.3 –295.8 7.7 –325.9
Rest of World 472.4 0 –324 21.1 169.4
Scenario 2
China –14.2 –77.3 –108 –6.1 –205.7
EastAsia 0.5 0 –47.5 –16.9 –63.9
SEAsia –3.9 –27.9 –26.7 –3.5 –62.2
India 287.4 1,111.5 634.2 114.8 2,148.1
XSASIA –18.4 –42.2 –41.3 –6.9 –108.9
USACAN –2.2 0 –28.4 –24.3 –54.9
LatinAmer –7 –6.4 0.3 –7.4 –20.4
EU_27 –48.5 0 –329.2 –34.4 –412.1
MENA 8.6 0 –38.3 –6.4 –36.1
SSA –11.1 –4.5 –7.9 –1.8 –25.2
Rest of World 1.4 0 –9.3 –7.4 –15.3
Source: Model simulations. 
Gains are attributed to zero tariffs on these products because of high, 14.4 per 
cent, average applied MFN tariff notified by India to the WTO,6 with 34.7 per 
cent and 10.5 per cent MFN tariffs on agricultural and industrial products, 
respectively. An analysis of the disposition of imports by India reveals a higher 
share for firms (55.1 per cent) followed by households (47.5 per cent) indicating 
higher exports by competitive EU firms under the liberalised scenario. 
Further under full liberalisation, India faces ToT losses (US$686 million) from 
trade diversion which is counterbalanced by a large and positive endowment 
6  The tariff structure notified by India to the WTO provides protection to agriculture (mainly 
beverages and tobacco followed by coffee, tea and oilseeds, fats and oils), automobiles and textiles 
and clothing sectors.
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effect (US$3125 million). Sector-level analysis shows that ToT losses are 
primarily driven by extraction and capital-intensive manufacturing sectors. 
These sectors are protected and higher imports together with ToT losses suggest 
possible trade diversion. 
Scenario 2 simulates selective sector liberalisation of textiles, apparel and 
leather that reports gains for India, but losses for the EU. Detailed country 
analysis reveals that China and South Asian countries, such as Bangladesh 
and Pakistan, lose from trade diversion effects of selective liberalisation under 
the FTA. An explanation is that zero tariffs post-FTA make Indian exports 
competitive, given that MFN tariff levied by the EU pre-FTA is 7.2 per cent (ad 
valorem equivalent), thus enabling Indian exporters to benefit by the preference 
margin. Further, positive ToT effects under selective liberalisation also lead to 
higher labour demand by textiles and leather, transport and construction sectors. 
Thus, gains for India drive resource allocation and endowment effect resulting 
from higher demand of unskilled labour. 
Table 7 presents sectoral output effects from liberalisation, that is, which 
sectors gain or lose under the proposed FTA.
Simulation results show that there is no large change in EU output but this 
is not the case with India where output of apparel, followed by leather, textiles 
and fibres increases. The output in textiles, apparel and leather sector, however, 
varies under both scenarios with larger increase in scenario 1 (54 per cent) 
compared to scenario 2 (38 per cent). The increased output is explained by 
Table 7 Output Effect (initial value and % change)
Sector
Initial Value  
(in millions of US$)
Scenario 1  
(% change)
Scenario 2  
(% change)
India EU27 India EU27 India EU27
Agrifood 242,062 1,822,872 0.1 0 0 0
Fibres 10,661 8,785 4.8 0 3.4 0
Extraction 37,693 203,651 –1.4 1 –0.5 0
Tex 45,380 246,950 6.5 –0.9 4.7 –0.5
Wap 7,555 262,003 30.2 –0.7 24.9 –0.4
Lea 5,459 104,485 10 –0.5 5.9 –0.1
LightMnfc 96,367 2,801,265 1 0 –0.8 0
HeavyMnfc 216,488 4,264,192 0.7 0.1 –0.6 0
Util_Cons 142478 1,754,420 1.5 0 0.3 0
TransComm 210,355 4,525,418 0.8 0 0.4 0
OthServices 184,524 8,609,255 –0.3 0 –0.1 0
Source: Model simulations.
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expansion of fibre trade under the FTA scenario. Also, EU’s output of capital 
intensive and manufactures goes up under full liberalisation. However, India’s 
output of textiles, apparel and leather increases substantially under scenario 2, 
which when interpreted in light of low factor prices in India hints at possible 
relocation of textile manufacturing from the EU, possibly from Eastern Europe 
into India as EU firms stand to benefit from low production costs. 
Table 8 presents the results on changes in factor demand and prices when there 
is full liberalisation of all sectors (scenario 1) and sector-specific liberalisation 
(scenario 2) under the proposed FTA. Simulation results show that the demand 
for factors of production, in particular for unskilled labour (since other factors 
are fixed), increases as output increases. In this case, the transmission mechanism 
is through export and import prices that in turn impact on domestic prices. 
Rising demand for unskilled labour leads to an initial upward pressure on 
wages in scenario 2 which in turn drives labour supply into textile, apparel and 
leather industry. 
Under scenario 1, factor prices in India show a tendency to rise (except 
unskilled labour). Further, an increase in land price complemented with increase 
in capital and skilled wages leads to an upward pressure on wages. In scenario 
2, when textiles, apparel and leather products are selectively liberalised under 
the FTA, demand for unskilled labour increases, though to a lesser extent, 
and remuneration for factors of production, that is, land, labour and capital, 
shows an upward trend. In combination with a minor increase in skilled wages 
and constant capital price, the signs of economic restructuring away from 
skilled manufacturing to labour-intensive production are evident. Further, as 
Table 8 Change in Factors and Factor Prices (% terms) 
Factor change (%) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
India EU_27 India EU_27
UnSkLab (% 
change)
1.6 0 0.6 0
UnSkLab (change 
in millions of US$)
3091.12 0 1159.17 0
Change in factor 
prices (%)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
India EU_27 India EU_27
Land 1.2 0 1.2 0
UnSkLab –0.2 0.1 0.7 0
SkLab 0.8 0.1 1 0
Capital 0.9 0.1 0.9 0
Source: Model simulations. 
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economies of scale are enabled by intra-industry trade, production efficiency 
is also likely to be improved. In static terms, tariff reduction and liberalisation 
through the FTA can be employed as a means to expand manufacturing by 
Indian firms through a reallocation of productive resources, that is, capital 
and labour, encouraging Indian firms to invest in capital saving technique, 
which will increase the labour–capital output with positive employment effects. 
Among explicit arguments for pushing FTA talks between the EU and India is 
the potential to gain from external and internal economies of scale, and that it 
is likely to impact on production patterns in both India and the EU, through 
specialisation. Gains from internal economies of scale are likely to be determined 
by firms’ interaction and their linkages within an industry. External economies 
of scale manifesting in intra-industry trade, however, are likely to emanate from 
inter-industry externalities at the national level, although these will again depend 
on differences among industry groups across the trading partners. 
Given that the simulations project an increase in exports of specific product 
groups liberalised and in light of higher demand for labour (unskilled and 
skilled) as well as capital, it is likely that production may be forced to move to 
the lower end of the value chain under the FTA. This implies that the FTA might 
potentially shift Indian apparel production to specialise in low-value production. 
In light of the striking benefits that are expected to accrue to textiles, apparel 
and utilities and construction sectors, it is likely that these sectors will benefit 
from higher investments and technology inflows, which in turn will enable 
Indian producers to be competitive.
6. concLusIon and the way Forward
Tariff elimination under scenario 1 under the FTA will enhance India’s exports 
of textiles, wearing apparel and footwear to the EU though at the cost of trade 
diversionary effects for other countries, with positive welfare and endowment 
effects. Factor prices change indicating that the current pattern of trade could 
change with India specialising in low-value production. Terms of trade losses 
for India follow from higher imports of extraction and capital-intensive 
manufacturing from the EU after the FTA. Scenario 2, which is sectoral 
liberalisation of textiles, apparel and leather products, shows gain for India 
from the endowment effect and resource allocation, but losses for the EU. 
Increased apparel sector output leads to higher demand for fibres, and suggests 
the possibility that EU textile manufacturing could possibly locate to India to 
benefit from low production costs under the FTA. This is reflected in higher 
demand for unskilled labour under the FTA. In combination with a minor 
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increase in skilled wages and constant capital price, tariff elimination on Indian 
textile under the FTA could potentially change production patterns. Further, 
higher output at low prices will make Indian products hugely competitive in 
comparison to Indonesia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Turkey and Mexico. Thus, 
India must focus on negotiating tariff elimination on textiles, wearing apparel 
and footwear under the FTA framework. But the question is why should the EU 
allow selective liberalisation and what are the gains in this? The way forward 
for India would be to consider accepting some EU demands, such as selective 
liberalisation in services sector mainly in legal and accounting services, banking 
and insurance, which have not been examined in this article. Modelling non-
tariff barriers in services trade is an enormous task in itself and may be done 
in a different in-depth study in the future. Such a study could throw light on 
the gains and losses that may arise from FTA in services sectors.
Since the launch of negotiations in 2007, not much progress has been made. 
A concerted effort is the call of the hour if the EU and India want to push this 
trade deal through. The new Indian government in power has a pro-market 
orientation blended with a nationalistic approach as inferred from the recent 
tough stand in the WTO on food security. Thus, a rethink of the negotiating 
strategy might just be what is needed to build a higher level of enthusiasm to 
restart FTA talks.
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